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ALI TAMIMI, ADAM HAHN, and SANDIP ROY,Washington State University, USA
Air traffic control increasingly depends on information and communication technology (ICT) to manage traffic
flow through highly congested and increasingly interdependent airspace regions. While these systems are
critical to ensuring the efficiency and safety of our airspace, they are also increasingly vulnerable to cyber
threats that could potentially lead to reduction in capacity and/or reorganization of traffic flows. In this paper,
we model various cyber threats to air traffic control systems, and analyze how these attacks could impact
the flow of aircraft through the airspace. To perform this analysis, we consider a model for wide-area air
traffic based on a dynamic queuing network model. Then we introduce three different attacks (Route Denial
of Service, Route Selection Tampering, and Sector Denial of Service) to the air traffic control system, and
explore how these attacks manipulate the sector flows by evaluating the queue backlogs for each sector’s
outflows. Furthermore, we then explore graph-level vulnerability metrics to identify the sectors that are most
vulnerable to various flow manipulations, and compare them to case-study simulations of the various attacks.
The results suggest that Route Denial of Service attacks have a significant impact on the target sector and lead
to the largest degradation to the overall air traffic flows. Furthermore, the impact of Sector Denial of Service
attack impacts are primarily confined to the target sector, while the Route Selection Tampering impacts are
mostly confined to certain aircraft.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems are responsible for ensuring the safety and efficiency of airspace.
The primary function of ATC systems is to guide each aircraft from the departure gate to the arrival
gate along planned routes, in such a way as to avoid conflicts. At longer time horizons, ATC systems
are also responsible for scheduling and routing aircraft to match demand with capacity, in a way
that is efficient for the stakeholders – this additional function is known as air traffic management.
Traffic control requires continuous communication between each aircraft and a number of ATC
facilities (towers, control centers) during different phases of the flight. In addition, for both traffic
control and management, various facilities (including towers and control centers, as well as airline
dispatch offices and central command elements) must communicate to decide aircraft flight plans,
enact modifications, and exchange information about traffic.
While air traffic control has historically been dependent on radar and VHF-based voice commu-
nication, modern air traffic control systems are increasingly using digital technology to enhance
the control and awareness of the airspace. For example, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is working on the transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
NextGen intends to modernize air traffic control to increase the capacity and reliability of the
airspace, while also improving safety and security, and minimizing the environmental impact of
aviation [3]. NextGen expands the use of digital communication through the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system which requires that aircraft broadcast their location, rather
than depending on radars. In addition, NextGen envisions a host of new decision-support tools for
traffic control and management, which will require automated communication as well as ingestion
of data sources (e.g. ensemble weather forecasts) from public-domain websites. While these ad-
vances should ideally lead to improved control and fewer delays, they also expand the system’s
attack surface and expose the system to threats of digital manipulation.
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2While NextGen technologies increase data sharing throughout the NAS to improve system
operations, this also introduces additional cybersecurity challenges [33]. The threat of cyber attack
to air traffic control has been well documented in both government reports and in academic
literature. FAA reports identify the need to improve the cybersecurity and resilience of the National
Airspace (NAS) [12], while the National Academy of Sciences has recommended the development of
improved threat models to explore the risk of air transportation system architectures [11]. While the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released numerous reports identifying potential
vulnerabilities in these systems [5, 34]. There have also been real-world intrusions to air traffic
control, as reports suggest attacks targeting British Air Traffic Control attempted to manipulate the
voice (VHF) communications [9], while sophisticated cyber attacks also infiltrated Sweden’s ATC
[23]. Beyond cyber attacks, a number of high-profile failures as well as a physical-world attack
have impacted the cyber infrastructure associated with the air traffic control system.
The potential impacts of cyber attacks and failure to air traffic control are multifacted, as the
recent events have demonstrated. First, such events may directly impact system safety, by interfering
with controllers’ ability to guide aircraft. In addition, however, these events have cascading impacts
on the wide-area management of traffic, thus complicating scheduling and routing, reducing system
efficiency, increasing controller workload, and potentially indirectly degrading safety at remote
locations. Safeguards are in place to reduce the risk of direct safety impacts, but the wide-area
impacts of cyber attacks on traffic control and management are not well understood, and are a
crucial concern. While current academic literature has explored air traffic control system security
and vulnerabilities, most of this work has focused on identifying technical vulnerabilities in air
traffic control protocols, but has not yet explored how such vulnerabilities impact system-level
aircraft routing and flows. On the other hand, models for system-level air traffic flows and their
management have been developed, but none of these studies realistically model the cyber system
and associated attack surface. This work aims to bridge the gap, by modeling the impact of cyber
attacks on air traffic flows, and analyzing attack impacts on regional air traffic management. To
perform this analysis, we present a model for air traffic flows management based on the dynamic
queuing network introduced in [30]. We then model various attacks from previous literature within
this network and calculate the impacts of these various attacks on air traffic flows. Moreover, we
apply the metric presented in [19] to identify vulnerable routes and sectors in air traffic flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows, Section 2 introduces related work, Section
3 presents the air traffic control system and dynamic queuing network model, Section 4 present
our threat model and flow manipulations, Section 5 provides system-level risk analysis from ATC
attacks, and Section 6 provides discussion on the resulting risk.
2 RELATEDWORKS
There have been many previous efforts exploring both the cybersecurity vulnerabilities within
ATC system, along with work exploring the vulnerability of ATC sectors and flows to traditional
disruptions (e.g., weather). Key efforts that explored the cybersecurity of air traffic control include
work by Strohmeier [24, 26] which introduces a survey of the communication devices used in ATC
and identifies vulnerabilities for each device. Further work in [4], explores cyber vulnerabilities
within the NEXTGEN platform, specifically the ADS-B communications and then explores potential
threat impacts based on the aircraft locations and attacker goals. In other work, they simulate an
environment including an air traffic model, existing surveillance systems, ADS-B systems, and
wireless channel model to investigate communication infrastructure of next generation air traffic
management and evaluate the performance of communication and optimize it [13, 14]. A variety
of other works have also explored vulnerabilities within ADS-B. In [21], they evaluated ADS-B
attacks and quantified various factors, such as the attacker’s location and the signal strength, based
3on their ability to manipulate various aircraft messages. In [15], the authors explore different
potential attacks against ADS-B systems, including network intrusions, message spoofing, and
communication malfunction, and analyzed each based on their threats, attack opportunities, weak-
nesses, and strengths. Broader ADS-B attack taxonomies and potential impacts are identified in [7],
including the techniques required for exploitation and their difficulty. A model-based approach that
investigates various physical and cyber vulnerabilities of ADS-B from different aspects is presented
in [28].
Other related work has explored theoretic models and analysis techniques to evaluate how
interruptions within air traffic sectors impact the broader system-level flows, i.e. the flow manage-
ment function of the air traffic control system. In [6], the authors reviewed recent models of air
traffic flow analysis and then explored queuing networks, traffic flow theory, and cellular automata
methods to discover relationships between system variables. They conclude that the combination
of model-based flow analysis and analysis of flight data leads to new insight into the air traffic
congestion mechanisms. In [22], the authors categorized the traffic flow models into three groups,
including linear dynamic system models, other Eulerian models, and partial differential equation
models, which can enable simplified analysis of wide-area dynamics. Furthermore, in [2, 8, 17]
the authors explored Eulerian network models for air traffic flows. These flow-level models for air
traffic were later enhanced to represent traffic at varied resolutions, to explicitly capture multiple
origin-destination pairs, and to model management initiatives as queueing elements [27, 31]. Finally,
agent-based modeling is explored in [32] where each flight and control agent is defined as an agent
and used to analyze different system properties such as throughput, capacity, delay, delay jitter,
and congestion. Furthermore, domain-specific multi-agent system models have also been explored
in the domain of air traffic management to provide constructs (which can be instantiated to imple-
ment specific tasks and procedures in air traffic management domain) for different scenarios [20].
Building on these studies, a series of recent works have begun to assess the propagative impacts of
traffic flow restrictions – whether due to cyber events, weather, or other causes (e.g. space vehicle
operations) [16, 18, 19].
The main purpose of this article is to pursue comprehensive modeling and analysis of the impacts
of cyber- attacks on regional air traffic flows. Toward this goal, we pursue integrated modeling
of classes of cyber attacks and queueing-type models of wide-area traffic evolution, and explore
simulation-based as well as graph-theoretic approaches to impact analysis. Specific contributions
include:
• Categorization and modeling of threats to communications that can impact en-route control
of air traffic.
• Integration of these threat/attack models with queueing-theoretic models for air traffic flows.
• Threat analysis of the proposed attacks using simulations of the integrated model.
• Simplified vulnerability analysis of the air traffic system using algebraic graph theory ap-
proaches, and comparison with simulation results.
Throughout the development, case studies are presented to illustrate and evaluate the methodology.
3 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
This section will provide an introduction to Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) operations
and the aircraft communications required to support it. ARTCC is required to support each phase of
a flight including: preflight, takeoff, departure, en-route, descent, approach, and landing [29]. The
main function of ARTCCs is to ensure appropriate aircraft separation and the safety of the various
sector routes [10]. ARTCCs accept aircrafts and pass them to other ARTCCs or terminal control
centers. There are 22 ARTCCs which are located in nineteen states [1]. Fig. 1 shows a subsection
4Fig. 1. A part of the map of Air
Route Traffic Control Centers
Fig. 2. Sectors of Minneapolis
ARTCC (ZMP) Fig. 3. Graph model of ZMP
ARTCC which is shown in Fig. 2
of the U.S ARTCC, where each ARTCC is giving a unique name (e.g., ZMP refers to Minneapolis
ARTCC). Furthermore, each ARTCC consists of several sectors as demonstrated in Fig. 2, which
shows that sectors of the ZMP ARTCC. This work will utilize a graph model to model and analyze
the flow of these sectors, as demonstrated in Fig. 3 which provides the graph for the ZMP ARTCC.
This section will provide an overview of how ARTCCs manage the flow of aircraft through
sectors. When an aircraft enters a sector, it communicates to the corresponding sector controller.
Each sector is controlled by one or a team of controllers and is responsible for separating of the
aircrafts. At the sector boundary, they are responsible for transferring control from the previous
controller. The process of transferring control and transferring communication is called the “hand-
off”. Fig. 4 shows the communications of en-route phase. The explanation of each time interval is
as follow:
• Over Sector: The aircraft flies over the sector and is controlled by that current sector, its only
communication is with the current sector in this phase.
• Com transfer: The aircraft is close to the sector boundary and it is still controlled by current
sector, but the communication will begin its transfer to the next sector before it reaches the
boundary.
• In boundary: The aircraft flies over the boundary and keeps the communication with next
sector.
• Ctrl transferring: The aircraft flies over the boundary and the control is passed from the
current sector to the next sector.
Fig. 4. Communications in the en-route phase when aircraft routes between the sectors and a table which
shows when and where each communication is established
5Based on the above explanation, Fig. 4 shows the communication of an aircraft during the en-route
phase as it passes to different sectors and ARTCCs. It also provides a table that identifies the
location between sectors, its communication to sector controllers and the controlling sector. At
t1, the aircraft communicates with sector A, which is responsible for control the aircraft. Before
leaving the sector A (t2), the communication is transferred to Sector B. Although in this step the
communication is transferred to sector B, the aircraft is still controlled by sector A. t3 demonstrates
the boundary of two sectors, Sector A passes the control of aircraft to the Sector B. t4, t5, and t6
are same as t1, t2, and t3 respectively, except that at t5 and t6 the communication and control are
passed to the sector in another ARTCC.
3.1 En-route Communications and Threats
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is the foundation of the NextGen air traffic
control infrastructure and will become mandatory in the U.S. by 2020 [4, 21]. The main function of
ADS-B is to improve aircraft surveillance by having planes broadcast their altitude, airspeed, and
location to other aircrafts and ground stations. Fig. 5 shows the architecture of ADS-B system [21].
ADS-B uses GPS to receive location data and then advertises the aircraft’s position and velocity
through a 1090 MHZ data link.
Fig. 5. ADS-B System Architecture[21]
A core problem of ADS-B is the lack of security, specifically message encryption and authen-
tication. Recent research has identified how attackers could manipulate these vulnerabilities to
manipulate the ARTCC operations [4] through the following attacks:
• Ghost Injection: In this attack, the attacker broadcasts ADS-B messages for a non-existing
aircraft (ghost aircraft). This results in the non-existing aircraft appearing on the radar screen
of the ground station with other valid aircrafts. During such an attack, it may not be possible
for the ground station to distinguish between the real aircrafts and non-existing aircrafts.
This confusion may lead to a station denial of service attack as the controllers can no longer
correctly serve the existing aircraft.
6• Flood Denial: In this attack, the attacker produces a jamming signal that disrupts the 1090
MHz data link. As a result, the ground station cannot receive aircrafts’ ADS-B messages
and the aircraft may disappear from the controller screen of ground station. Therefore, the
ground station is unable to send a controlling message to the aircrafts and they will continue
their routes regardless of any command.
• Virtual Trajectory Modification: By selectively jamming an aircraft’s message and replac-
ing it with a modified message, an attacker can report the wrong location of the aircraft.
Therefore, the ground station will have non-existing aircraft on its screen instead of the
real aircraft. As a result of this attack, the controller manages the flows based on the wrong
assumption which is the non-existing aircraft.
Based on these previously introduced threats, we propose three attack scenarios to identify how
each threat manifests into a impact on ARTCC flows. In the next section, we explain how these
attacks influence air traffic flows using the DQN model.
Scenario 1: Route Denial of Service (RDOS):An attacker injects spoofed aircrafts in a specific
route using the Ghost Injection attack. Therefore, the air traffic controller sees a combination of
real and ghost aircraft on their displays. Since the controller is unable to distinguish between real
and ghost aircraft, it cannot serve the real aircrafts and will shut down the targeted route to prevent
any spacing violations. Therefore, the aircrafts cannot be served and have to stay in their current
sectors. If the attacker is only targeting one route, it is called a partial RDOS (P-RDOS). If the
attacker is targeting all of the outflows of a sector, it is called a complete RDOS (C-RDOS).
Scenario 2: Route Selection Tampering (RST): In the second scenario, the attacker modifies
the ADS-B message of an aircraft using the Virtual Trajectory Modification attack. Therefore, the
route of aircraft is changed on the controller screen. Therefore, the controller manages a flow
including a non-existing aircraft. On the other hand, since the messages of the real aircraft are
jammed, it is not included in the flow management.
Scenario 3: Sector Denial of service (SDOS): In this scenario, the attacker applies a Flood
Denial attack to a sector. The attacker sends the jamming signal to the VHF channel of a sector
controller and the controller cannot send any instruction related to queue management to the
aircrafts. Therefore, the aircrafts continue their routes without queuing management. This attack
increases traffic of the outgoing routes. Therefore, the next sectors face the unpredicted traffics and
the backlog of their queues increases which leads to delay.
3.2 DQN Model for Air Traffic Flows Management
In this section, we present an air traffic flow model based on a dynamic queuing network (DQN).
In the graph model, each node presents a sector where the inflows and outflows are represented
by directed edges. Therefore, if there is a route from sector A to sector B, there will be a directed
edge from node A to node B. Fig. 6 shows the graph model of a sector. Ii is an inflow which comes
from another sector. Each aircraft that comes through Ii should leave the sector through one of
the outflows (Oi ) based on its flight route. Each outflow has three parameters. C is the capacity of
outflow and shows the number of aircrafts that can be served by the sector through the outflow
in each time interval. Q is the queue of outflow and contains the aircrafts that are waiting to be
served. The number of aircraft waiting in the queue in each time interval is the backlog which is
presented by b. In other words, b is the number of elements of Q .
In our model, The state variable is Xi (t ) that is the backlog of the i-th outflow at time t . The
number of aircrafts which comes into the queue of outflows is represented byUi (t ), while the number
of aircrafts which be served is smaller or equal to the capacity of outflow (C). Therefore, an attacks
can be modeled as a changes the flow graph structure through edge removals or manipulations to
7Fig. 6. The DQN model parameters
edge flows. The model also defines Uj as the number of aircraft which come to the queue of output
O j . I
routes−−−−−→ U is the mapping function which finds the corresponding outflow for each aircraft
based on the flight route. Our model is as follow:

x1(t )
...
xn (t )
 =

U1(t )
...
Un (t )
 +

x1(t − 1)
...
xn (t − 1)
 −

C1
...
Cn
 (1)
• xi (t ) is the backlog of the sector for the outflow number i at time t ,
• Ii (t ) is the number of airplanes that come to the sector through the inflow number i at time t ,
• Ci is the number of airplanes that can be served at the outflow number i of the sector in each
time interval,
• Ui (t ) is the number of airplanes leaving the sector through the outflow number i in each time
interval.
If the value of xi (t ) is negative, the number of aircrafts in the queue (backlog of last time interval)
plus the number of aircrafts that come into the queue in the current time interval is smaller than
the ith outflow capacity and sector controller can serve all of the aircrafts of the ith outflow . In
this condition (xi (t ) < 0), we consider xi (t ) = 0.
4 THREAT ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the attack scenarios introduced in Section 3.1 on the proposed DQN
model to enable the analysis of their impact to air traffic flows.
4.1 Route Denial of Service (RDOS)
The RDOS attack assumes that the attacker may cause a controller screen change by injecting
non-existing aircrafts. Since the controller is unable to distinguish between the real and non-existing
aircrafts, it leads to a route or sector shutdown. If there is a route shutdown (P-RDOS), the controller
cannot serve the aircrafts through the targeted route and should reroute the aircrafts in the queue.
If there is a sector shutdown (C-RDOS), other sectors should reroute the aircrafts which are heading
to the targeted sector and the aircrafts which are already in the queue of targeted sectors should
wait until the attack is recognized. We define the attack model for C-RDOS as follow.

x1(t )
...
xn (t )
 =

u1(t )
...
un (t )
 +

x1(t − 1)
...
xn (t − 1)
 − (1 − b(t )) ×

C1
...
Cn
 (2)
8(a) RDOS attack (b) RST attack (c) SDOS attack
Fig. 7. Attacks demonstration in flow graph
The attack model for P-RDOS is defined as follow.
x1(t )
...
xn (t )
 =

u1(t )
...
un (t )
 +

x1(t − 1)
...
xn (t − 1)
 −

1 − b1(t )
...
1 − bn (t )
 ·

C1
...
Cn
 (3)
where b is defined as follow:
b(t ) =
{
1, complete attack happens
0, no attack
bi (t ) =
{
1, partial attack happens at route number i
0, no attack at route number i
In the graph model, the outflow edges that correspond to the targeted sector should be removed.
Suppose that in Fig. 3, sector 30 is the target of attack. Fig. 7a shows the structure of graph after
the RDOS attack.
4.2 Route Selection Tampering (RST)
In a RST attack, an attacker could jam the ADS-B signal of an aircraft and inject new ADS-B
messages of non-existing aircraft using Virtual Trajectory Modification attack. In this condition,
aircraft maintains the original route, however, there is a route change on the controller screen that
shows the aircraft is heading to another sector. In this attack, the sector which is the destination of
non-existing aircraft has an additional aircraft (non-existing aircraft) in the queue management. In
this attack, we show vector b as follow.
bi =
{
1, attack effects on outflow number i
0, no attack
If more than one aircraft is targeted, the value of b can be greater than one.
x1(t )
...
xn (t )
 =

u1(t )
...
un (t )
 +

b1(t )
...
bn (t )
 +

x1(t − 1)
...
xn (t − 1)
 −

C1
...
Cn
 (4)
Fig. 7b shows the RST attack. After leaving sector 30, the attacker jams the ADS-B messages
which are received by sector 17 and inject the new aircraft to the route which heading to sector
38. Both sectors 17 and 38 are affected by the attack. Although sector 17 cannot receive ADS-B
messages of aircraft, the real aircraft is heading to this sector and should be served. Moreover, a
9non-existing aircraft is shown on the controller screen of Sector 38 and should be managed by this
sector.
4.3 Sector Denial of Service (SDOS)
In this section, we introduce the SDOS attack and present our model. In the SDOS attack, after
establishing the voice communication between the aircraft and the receiving sector, the attacker jams
this communication. Since the sector cannot send messages to the aircraft, the aircraft continues
its route without queue management. As a result of the SDOS attack, the sector cannot inform the
aircrafts about the over service capacity condition. In other words, all the aircrafts in the sector
continue their routes without waiting in the queues. The consequence of this attack is more visible
in the sectors that are after the targeted sector. We present the model of this attack as follow. Since
the aircrafts do not come into the queues, the backlog is equal to zero.
x1(t )
...
xn (t )
 = 0 (5)
Since the attack hinders queue management, the outflows of the targeted sector increases with
no limitation and changes the inflows of the sectors that are after it. Therefore, aircraft will ignore
the queues of the targeted sector and continue their routes. In the flow graph model, the node
which represents the targeted sector is removed and the outflow edges of previous sectors connect
to the inflow edges of next sectors. Suppose that in Fig. 3, Sector 30 is the target of SDOS attack.
Fig. 7c shows the changes in the graph structure after the attack. The major impact of this attack is
in the sectors that have an inflow from the targeted sector. In Fig. 7c the largest impact is found in
sectors 17 and 38. The number of aircrafts in their queues increases and it needs more time to serve
them. The reason is that there is no queue management in sector 30 and all aircrafts are directed to
next sectors without staying in the queues. As a result of this situation, the number of aircrafts
increases in the queues of sector 17 and sector 38.
5 FLOW IMPACT CASE STUDIES
This section investigates the impact of the proposed attacks on a test system to analyze the queue
backlogs and resulting delay. The case study that we use is as follows, at t = 0, there are 21 airplanes
in the system which are in the queues of the sectors. Sectors 3,4, and 5 are the source of aircrafts.
The destination of each aircraft is assumed to be sector 12. Fig. 8 shows the initial condition of the
flow graph, where c represents the capacity of service in each queue and q represents the number
of aircraft in the queue. In the following, we investigate the impacts of different attacks on the flow
graph. The routes are as follows: route1 = [3, 7, 11, 12], route2 = [3, 8, 11, 12], route3 = [4, 8, 11, 12],
and route4 = [5, 8, 11, 12].
The impact analysis shows the three scenarios for the RDOS, RST, and SDOS attack.
• In the RDOS scenario 9, the attack starts at t = 1, targets sector 8, and lasts one time interval.
Therefore, sector 8 cannot serve the aircrafts at t = 1. The RST scenario 10 starts at t = 0 and
targets aircraft number 15.
• In the RST scenario 10, the attack starts at t = 0 to show the impact of the attack on sectors
7 and 8 at t = 1 and sector 11 at t = 2 of attack. The attacker creates a non-existing (ghost)
aircraft using the ID of airplane 15 between sectors 3 and 8. Simultaneously, airplane number
15 vanishes from the radar screen when it travels from sector 3 to sector 7.
• In the SDOS scenario 11, the attack starts at t = 2, targets sector 8, and lasts one time interval.
Unlike the RDOS attack where the most affected sector is the target sector (sector #8), in
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Fig. 8. Air Traffic Flows of the example system Fig. 9. Scenario of complete RDOS attack
Fig. 10. Scenario of RST attack Fig. 11. Scenario of SDOS attack
SDOS attack, the most affected sector is the sector 11 where is located after target sector.
Therefore, we start the attack at t = 2 to be able to compare the effect of different attacks on
the same sector at the same time. In other words, By starting the RDOS attack at t = 1 and
the SDOS attack at t = 2, we can see the effect of attacks on sector 11 at the same time.
For each attack, we extract the backlog x811(t ) for sector 8 and x1112 (t ) for sector 11 which are
located after target of attack. x ij (t ) is the backlog of sector i for the outflow which is directed to
sector j. Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show x811(t ) and x1112 (t ) respectively for each of the three attacks.
In the RDOS attack, since the target sector (sector 8) can not serve the airplanes, the backlog
increases. On the other hand, decreasing the inflow of sector 11 leads to decreasing the backlog in
this sector during the attack. Therefore, the aircrafts that come to the sector 11 from other inflows
(aircraft 15) can be served faster.
In the RST attack, there is a non-existing (ghost) aircraft in the queue that increases the x811(t ).
Since sector 8 schedules a non-existing aircraft, it cannot use all the outflow capacity which is the
inflow of sector 11. This issue leads to a decreased backlog of sector 11. The time of arrival of the
target aircraft (aircraft 15) increases. In the SDOS attack, all the aircrafts in the queue of the target
sector (sector 8) fly to the next sector. It leads to a decreased backlog of the target sector. On the
other hand, since all the aircrafts that left the target sector arrive the sector 11 together, the backlog
of sector 11 increases.
11
Fig. 12. x811(t ) in normal and attacks cases Fig. 13. x1112 (t ) in normal and attacks cases
Fig. 14 shows the time of arrival of aircrafts for the normal and attack cases. The results show
that the RDOS attack presents the greatest impact to the aircrafts 6, 11 and 17. The RST attack
increases the time of arrival of aircraft 15. Finally, the SDOS attack effects on aircrafts 14 and 15.
Fig. 14. Arrival time of aircrafts in normal and attacks condition
6 SYSTEM-LEVEL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
While the previous section only explored the vulnerability of a small case study, the overall ATC risk
needs to evaluate to the entire ATC system, which is a large graph with many sectors. Therefore, we
explore previously identified vulnerability metrics, specifically those proposed in [19], to determine
if they provide a strong indicator of cybersecurity vulnerabilities with ATC. Then, we estimate the
vulnerability of the sectors and routes of a given system using the metric. We present a method
to verify the results of the metric to evaluate the impacts of the attacks and compare the results.
Finally, we investigate the impacts of attacks on the backlog of the airspace system.
6.1 Vulnerability Analysis Metric
In this part, we explain a metric that is proposed in [19]. Using the metric, we measure the
vulnerability of different sectors and routes. By analyzing the results, we could find which sectors
and routes of the model are more vulnerable to different types of attack.
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VT =
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
f αi j | vi −vj |β
λc
(6)
The metric is derived from the flow graph and nominal traffic flow. The procedure for calculating
the metric is:
• Create Laplacian Matrix (L): This matrix is n × n, where n is the number of vertices (sectors)
in the flow graph. If there is an edge (route) between vertex i and vertex j the value of Li j
is equal to -1. Otherwise, it is 0. The value of diagonal elements (Lii ) is equal to the value
which makes the sum of the row to zero.
Li j =

−1 there is an edge from i to j
0 there is no edge from i to j
−∑j ̸=i Li j i = j (7)
• Calculate eigenvector : Calculate the eigenvector v which corresponds to the smallest positive
eigenvalue.
• Vulnerability metric: Equation 8 shows the vulnerability metric for the edge between vertex i
and vertex j . Where fi j is the flow density (number of aircrafts) between sector i and sector j .
vi and vj are the ith and jth elements of the eigenvector. the constants α and β are positive
integers that weight the flows (fi j ) and eigenvector component differences respectively.
Vi j = f αi j | vi −vj |β (8)
If we want to find the total vulnerability metric for the flow graph, we use Equation 6. Where
λ is the eigenvalue and c is a constant that will be tuned based on a formal analysis.
We use Equations 6 and 8 to determine which of the routes and sectors are more vulnerable.
In the rest of this section, we explain how this metrics is used to evaluate the impact of different
attacks.
1- C-RDOS attack: In complete RDOS attack, all the outflows are blocked such that no aircraft
can pass through outflows. Therefore, in the flow graph model, all routes of the target sector should
be removed. This change makes the flow graph disconnected and we can not show the effect of
the target sector in the calculation of the vulnerability metric. For the calculating of the metric in
this condition, each time we keep one edge of the target node and remove others and calculate the
metric using Formula 6. The procedure repeats for all edges. If the target node hasm edges we do
the procedurem times. In this attack, VT is the sum of the calculated values. If the target sector t
has k routes and VTt i shows the vulnerability metric when the only available route of target sector
(t ) is ti , Equation 9 shows the total vulnerability metric.
VT =
k∑
i=1
VTt i (9)
2- P-RDOS attack: In partial RDOS attack, one of the outflows of the target sector is blocked.
For calculating the vulnerability metric, first we remove the edge corresponding to the blocked
route from the graph. Then calculate VT using Equation 6.
3- SDOS attack: In SDOS attack, the outflows of target sector increases and no route is blocked.
There is no change in the structure of graph model during this attack and only fi j of the outflows
of target sector increases. Therefore, we calculate VT using Equation 6.
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6.2 Metric Comparison
In this section, we calculate the presented metric for the routes and sectors of the flow graph that
is shown in Fig. 15.
RDOS attack: In this experiment, we investigate the impact of the RDOS attack on different
sectors. The example of Fig. 15 has 12 sectors. In complete RDOS, each time one of the sectors is
the target of attack and then we calculate the metric. By comparing the values, we can find which
sectors or routes are more important in the flow graph. In partial RDOS, each time we suppose that
one of the routes is the target of attack and calculate the metric. In our experiment, each route is
bi-direction. We assume that the value of f for all routes is equal to 2. Fig. 16 shows the results of
complete RDOS attack and Fig. 17 shows the results of partial RDOS attack. The results show that
sectors 1, 5 and 8 are more vulnerable than other sectors. Moreover, the routes 11, 12, 2, 6, 6, 10,
and 10, 12 are more vulnerable than other routes.
SDOS attack: In this experiment, we investigate the impact of the SDOS attack on different
sectors. We use the example of Fig. 15 for this experiment. Each time one of the sectors is the target
of attack and then calculate the value ofVT . We suppose that the number of aircrafts in outflows of
targeted sector increases by the factor of three. In other words, the normal value of f is equal to 2,
and the value of f for outflows of the target sector is equal to 6. Fig. 18 shows the results.
RST attack: Since the RST attack does not change the structure of flow graph and has a low
impact on changing the value of f (only the value of f for two routes is changed), we do not show
any results from this analysis.
6.3 Metric verification for RDOS attack
In this section, we investigate the structure of the flow graph when a sector is the target of RDOS
attack. We present different parameters and find a formula to compute vulnerability of sectors and
paths in air traffic flows. Then we compare our results with the values of the metric presented in
the previous section (VT ). For calculating vulnerability degree in air traffic flows, we need to know
that how many paths are eliminated after shutting down a sector. First we introduce two variables,
lostpathnk and reducepath
n
k , as defined below.
• lostpathnk : If there are α routes with length of n between the sector i and sector j, but when
sector k is shutdown (k ̸= i and k ̸= j) there is no longer any routes with length of n, then
lostpathnk (i, j) = α . This factor shows when sector k is shutdown, all the routes with length of
n between i and j are eliminated. Then, lostpathnk =
∑
i ∈S
∑
j ∈S lostpathnk (i, j). Where S is the
set of sectors in air traffic flows. We can use same definition to find the number of routes that
are eliminated after shutting down a route. In this condition, k is a path that is shutdown.
lostpathnk (i, j) =
{
α if all the a routes with length of n between i and j are eliminated
0 if at least one route with length of n is remained between i and j (10)
• reducepathnk : If there are α routes with length of n between the sector i and sector j and
when the target sector k is shutdown (k ̸= i and k ̸= j) there remains β routes (0 < b < a)
with length of n between i and j , reducepathnk (i, j) = α − β . This factor shows that by shutting
down a sector, some routes with length of n between i and j are eliminated. But α − β routes
are remained. Then, reducepathnk =
∑
i ∈S
∑
j ∈S reducepathnk (i, j). We can use same definition
to find the number of routes that are reduced when a route is shutdown. In this condition, k
is a path that is shutdown.
reducepathnk (i, j) =
{
α − β if β routes of the all α routes with length of n between i and j are remained
0 if all the routes or no routes with length of n are eliminated between i and j
(11)
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Fig. 15. Example of air traffic flows Fig. 16. VT for each sector which is under complete
RDOS attack
Fig. 17. VT for each route which is under partial RDOS
attack
Fig. 18. VT for each sector which is under SDOS attack
• de f aultpathn : The number of routes with length of n in air traffic flow graph.
Using presented parameters, we can define a measure for vulnerability of air traffic flows.
Vk =
max (n)∑
i=1
(max (n) − i + 1) [λ(lostpath
i
k ) + (1 − λ)(reducepathik )]
de f aultpathi
(12)
Where Vk is the vulnerability of the air traffic flows when sector k (or route k) is shutdown. The
term (max(n) − i + 1) defines the weight of the routes based on their length. The constants λ is
0.5 < λ < 1 and weight the sensitivity of lost paths respect to reduced paths. We use the example
of Fig. 15 and calculate Vk for each sector and route. We use λ = 0.75 in our calculations. Table 1
shows the comparison between our metric (Vk ) and the metric presented in [19] (VT ). The rank
column shows which sectors are more vulnerable. The results show that the VK metric recognizes
the sector #5 and the sector #1. TheVT metric identifies same sectors as the most vulnerable sectors
but in the different order (sector #1 as the first rank and sector #5 as the second rank). The main
reason is that they have more routes compared with other sectors. Moreover, some of the paths
that pass through them are not replaceable by other paths. Both metrics rank the sectors #8 and
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#12 as the third and fourth vulnerable sectors. Sector #8 has four routes (same as sectors #1 and #5);
however, it is less vulnerable than sector #1 and #5. The main reason is that the paths of sector
#8 are less critical than the paths of sectors #1 and #5. For example, by shutting down the sector
#5 we lose a path with the length of three between sectors #1 and #12 that is not replaceable by
other paths. But, by shutting down the sector #8 all the paths that pass through this sector could
be replaced by other paths. For example, the path between sector #1 and #11 which goes through
sector #8 could be replaced by the path that passes through sector #3 and #7 and has the same
length. By comparing the results, we can find that the difference of the rank in both metrics is at
most 1.
Sector VK VT Difference
Rank Value Rank Value
1 2 15.68 1 35.49 1
2 5 12.1 6 28.82 1
3 7 8.56 7 25.38 0
4 12 3.36 12 17.5 0
5 1 20.48 2 34.95 1
6 8 5.87 8 21.88 0
7 10 5.56 11 18.38 1
8 3 14.92 3 34.9 0
9 11 5.25 10 18.79 1
10 9 5.69 9 21.53 0
11 6 11.71 5 31.2 1
12 4 12.45 4 31.65 0
Table 1. Compare metrics for Complete RDOS attack
6.4 Long-term Impacts on Air Traffic Flow
The factors such as the capacity of outflow (Ci ) and the size of the input of queue (Ui ) change
the impact of an attack in the long-term. During the attack the value of the backlog increases and
after the attack it does not be changed, but it is greater than the value before the attack. In this
part, we investigate the impacts of attacks in different cases for the complete RDOS. In this attack,
we consider two different scenarios to compare the results. In one scenarioUi (t ) < Ci (t ) and in the
second scenario Ui (t ) = Ci (t ). We use the flow graph of Fig. 15 for our examples. The properties of
attack are as follow.
• The attack starts at t = 3 and lasts until t = 6. For the first case the routes of sector 5 are the
target of attack and for the second case, the routes of sector 11 are the target of attack. For
sector 5 we focus on the outflow to sector 9 and for sector 11 we focus on the outflow to
sector 12.
• X 59 (0) = X 1112 (0) = 2. The initial backlog of the queue for both cases is 2.
• C59(t ) = C1112(t ) = 3. In each time interval, three aircrafts are served.
• In the first case U 59 (t ) = 3 and for the second case U 1112 (t ) = 2. It is the number of aircrafts
which come to the queue in each time interval.
Fig. 19 shows how the attack affects the backlog. The result shows that if Ui (t ) < Ci (t ), the sector
returns to normal condition after some time intervals. But if Ui (t ) = Ci (t ), effects of the attack
remains. In another experiment, we investigate the rate of backlog increasing. We keep all the
properties from the previous experiment and only changeC1112 = 2 for the second case. In both cases
Ui (t ) = Ci (t ) but has different values. Fig. 20 shows how the attack affects the backlog. The results
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Fig. 19. Backlog when for the outflow of sector 5
Ui (t ) = Ci (t ) and for the outflow of sector 11 Ui (t ) <
Ci (t )
Fig. 20. Backlog when for the outflow of sector 5
Ui (t ) = Ci (t ) = 3 and for the outflow of sector 11
Ui (t ) = Ci (t ) = 2
of two experiments show that if Ui (t ) = Ci (t ), the backlog increases by the rate of Ui (t ) during the
attack. IfUi (t ) < Ci (t ), first the backlog decreases with rate ofUi (t ) −Ci (t ) and during the attack it
increases with rate ofUi (t ).
7 DISCUSSION AND POTENTIAL MITIGATIONS
While the previous sections introduced a combination of analytical attack scenarios and vulnerability
metrics to evaluate the impact of attacks to ATC, this section will provide further discussion
identifying the key factors contributing to the risk of these attacks based on the significance of the
route manipulations. During the complete RDOS attack, all the outflows are blocked and all of the
inflows should wait in the queues and increase the backlog of the queues. Therefore, the rate of
inflows during the attack has a significant role in the impact of attacks. If the rate of inflows ism
aircrafts per time interval and the sector has n outflows, The backlog of queues increases by the
rate ofm/n aircrafts per time interval averagely. The rate for each outflow i isUi which is the input
of the queue of outflow. The value of C is an important factor to decrease the impacts of the attack
when it is finished. If there are n outflows and ∑ni Ci = c , the aircrafts are served by the rate of c/n
per time interval averagely. The rate for each outflow is Ci . For partial RDOS attack, the impact is
only on one outflow.
The target of a RST attack is an aircraft. Therefore, there is not any blockage in the inflows or
outflows. As the attacker is only injecting a fake route for the target aircrafts, the backlog of one of
the outflows increases one unit.
For SDOS attack, as a result of removing the queue management, the outflows increase. If the
attack happens, all the aircraft in the queue and all of the new aircrafts pass through outflows.
after that, there is no aircraft in the queue and all the new aircrafts pass to outflows. The rate of
increasing the outflow in the first time interval of attack is bi +Ui and after that isUi . This large
amount of outflows impacts on the inflows of the next sectors and leads to increasing the backlog
of them.
The RDOS attack increases the backlog of the target sector. RST attack changes the backlog of
original destination and new destination which is injected by the attacker. In the SDOS attack,
the backlog increases for the sectors that have a route from the targeted sector. Table 2 shows a
summary of attacks. We know the value of Ui (t ) effects the backlog in different attacks. Fig. 21
shows the effects ofUi (t ) to the sectors. The blue line shows the effect whenUi (t ) < Ci . In other
words, the number of aircrafts that enter the queue is smaller than the number of aircrafts get
served. In this condition, the backlog decreases to zero in some time intervals after the attack.
During the attack the value of backlog increases. When attack ends, since Ui (t ) < Ci the value of
backlog decreases. The green dash line shows the effect of attack whenUi (t ) = Ci . When the attack
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happens, the backlog increases. After the attack, since Ui (t ) = Ci the value of backlog remains
constant, as the effect of attack continues. The dotted red line shows the condition thatUi (t ) > Ci .
In this condition, the value of the backlog increases before the attack. During the attack, the value of
backlog continues to increase with the larger rate. When the attack finishes, the rate of increasing
returns to the normal value.
Attacks RDOS RST SDOS
Effected inflow outflow outflow
by (minor)
Backlog
increase Ui 1 bi +Ui
rate
Impacts single 2 multi
on sector sectors sectors
Table 2. Attacks impact summary
Fig. 21. How the value ofUi (t ) effects on backlog
Table 3 shows a conclusion of the proposed attacks, including their goal, difficulty, and attack
vector.
Attack Impact Difficulty Attack vector Goal
RDOS High Medium Message Injecting Shutdown route or sector
RST Low High Message Jamming and injecting creating a fake route
SDOS Medium-High Low Jamming Bypass queuing
Table 3. Attacks conclusion
7.1 Attack Mitigation Techniques
There are several countermeasures such as secure location verification and secure broadcast
authentication methods that help to increase the security of ADS-B system and avoid these attacks
[25], however, these methods have some drawbacks. Secure location verification methods usually
need expensive systems which would not be cost-effective for ADS-B. The secure authentication
methods face the problems such as small length of ADS-B message that does not have enough space
for more headers (e.g, message authentication code). Furthermore, the large number of aircrafts
and they’re wide geographic dispersion across multiple countries and their ATC domains makes
the key management and distribution more difficult [25].
In lack of the attack mitigation techniques, rerouting the blocked aircraft could help to decrease
the backlog in RDOS attack.approaches may exist to mitigate the impacts of these attacks. In SDOS
attack, Increasing the value of c for a short period in the sectors which are located after the target
sector leads to decreasing the backlog with the more significant rate.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explained three different attack scenarios (RST, RDOS, SDOS) to air traffic control
systems, develop a formal DQN model to evaluate their impact on a simplified model. The RDOS
attack is launched by injecting the ADS-B message of non-existing aircrafts into air traffic system.
While the controllers can not distinguish real and injected aircrafts, they don’t serve the aircrafts
and the routes of the sector are shutdown. As a result of this attack, the outflows are blocked and
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the aircrafts have to wait to be served. The RST attack blocks ADS-B message from a valid aircraft
and injects manipulated ADS-B message for the airplane. This attack affects on two outflows of
the sector and makes changes in queue management of the sector controller. The SDOS attack is
lunched by jamming the messages near the sector controller. As a result of this attack, aircrafts
are unable to receive the commands of the sector about queue management and pass the sector
without waiting in queue. Based on this analysis we demonstrate that the RDOS attack provides
the greatest impact to the ATC routes and will likely introduce the greatest delays, while the SDOS
and RST attack maintain more confined impact to specific planes and routes.
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